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ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς
ὄνομα1
One the only wise is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of
Zeus.
Clement, Stromateis V, 115, I
‘But one must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the pas-
sion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover
without passion: a mediocre fellow.’ 
S. Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity
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1 I take moûnon with the subject (‘one the only wise’) implying a supreme God, as in Xenophanes.
Zenos in the genitive permits H to use the old poetic form and recall the verb to live: zên (instead of
Dios, perhaps rejecting, with the name ‘Zeus’, his ordinary cult and poetical description). The etymo-
logical play was evident in Pherecydes Fr. 1; Aeschylus, Suppliants (584 f.), Cratylus (396 a 7; 410 d:
Zeus is called so ‘because he is the cause of life’ and ‘through whom life belongs in every case to all
living things’. (Cf. Kahn, 1979, 269-70).
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Abstract
The objective of this article is to consider whether the Commentator of the
Derveni Papyrus can contribute to our understanding of the double divine will to
reject and accept the name of Zeus. After examining some inconsistencies that the
traditional readings raise, the authoress appeals to the Derveni Papyrus in order to
offer an alternative diachronic interpretation. On this reading, the unique wise one,
in the first place, does not wish to be called by the name of Zeus because this name
ascribes birth and diversification to it, while it is, as such, eternal and simple. On
the other hand, as it cyclically becomes multiple, it is also willing to be identified
with Zeus, the God who, according to the Papyrus, swallowed his Grandfather’s
phallus along with Mind, got pregnant of everything and re-created the universe.
This account fits with Heraclitus’ doctrine that there is no creation of the world but
some kind of derivation of it from the one, and vice-versa. 
Key words: one wise, Zeus, cosmos, anthropomorphism, diachronic reading.
Resumen
Se trata de determinar si el Comentador del Papiro de Derveni puede arrojar
alguna luz sobre el problema de cómo interpretar la doble y contraria ‘voluntad’ de
lo divino de rechazar y aceptar la atribución del nombre de Zeus. Se examinan las
incongruencias que plantean las interpretaciones corrientes, y se apela al papiro
para ofrecer una interpretación alternativa diacrónica. Según ésta, en primer lugar,
lo uno sabio no desea ser llamado con el nombre de Zeus, porque este nombre atri-
buye nacimiento y diversificación a un principio que es eterno y simple. Por otra
parte, en cuanto deviene múltiple cíclicamente, también admite ser identificado con
Zeus, el dios que, de acuerdo con el Papiro, tragó el falo de su abuelo junto con
Metis, quedó embarazado de todo y re-creó el universo. Esto concuerda con la doc-
trina heraclítea según la cual no hay creación del mundo sino una cierta derivación
de todas las cosas a partir de lo uno y viceversa. 
Palabras Clave: uno sabio, Zeus, cosmos, antropomorfismo, lectura diacrónica.
I. The paradox
The aim of this paper is to consider whether the Commentator of the Derveni
Papyrus, who offers an allegorical interpretation of an orphic poem, and feels in a
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position to make sense of many riddles with regard to the triumph of Zeus, can con-
tribute to our understanding of the meaning of Fr. 32. The main hermeneutical prob-
lem that this fragment raises is the hidden sense in which contrary wills can be
attributed to ‘the only wise one’. At first sight, as it has been assumed by many
scholars, being a principle, it must be unwilling to be called by the name of a god,
for the intention of the fragment seems to imply the rejection of anthropomorphic
accounts to the supreme principle2. However, the principle does also exhibit will-
ingness to accept the name. Therefore, the paradox remains and urges us to attempt
to clarify the following questions:
1. why should this neutral, unique, wise principle reject being called by the name of
Zeus in the first place;
2. in which sense should it accept being called by this name and be identified with this
particular god, rather than with any other. 
We should be cautious not to fall into Aristotle’s trap here, whose complaint was
that Heraclitus “did not use the categories of formal logic, but tended to describe the
same thing (or roughly the same thing) now as a god, now as a form of matter, now
as a rule of behaviour or principle which was nevertheless a physical constituent of
things”3. As we shall see, the same complaint can be addressed to the Commentator
of the Derveni Papyrus. The key to comprehension seems to lie in between, by
assuming a kind of intelligent supremely wise principle that, only in a second stage,
would wish to be identified with the King of the gods. 
In order to make this fragment understandable, it has been argued that the name
‘Zeus’ contains a reference to the verb ‘to live’ (zên), which turns out to be appro-
priate for the characterization of an ever-living principle that keeps the universe
alive (Fr. 30). In this sense the supreme principle would admit being called by the
name of life. It has been argued4 that no name can be privileged, for the supreme
wise principle is also supposed to be a principle of death, and as such, will not be
willing to accept the name of life in the first place. Therefore the only wise one is
effectively being described as Life-Death. 
However, the association between Zenós and zên needs linguistic justification
for Zeus is rather regarded as the God of the bright sky (cf. fr. 120), by contrast with
the God of the underworld, who rules over a kingdom of darkness. He is alive, of
course, like all the gods, but one may wonder whether he is dominantly seen as the
God of Life. On the other hand, if no name were really suitable, the wise cosmic
principle should not ‘be willing’ to be called by any particular name. Moreover, this
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interpretation does not seem to account for the fact that the negative wish precedes
the positive one: the unique wise one would not -in the first place- wish to be called
by the name of Zeus (Life) because (we are to assume) it is also and in the first
place, a principle of Death. Does this interpretation make sense? In my view, it
seems bizarre and we should attempt to find a better one. 
II. Mining Heraclitus’s fragments
1. The god subsumes opposite aspects of the world
Hyppolitus (Refutation of All Heresies 9.10.8) is the source of problematic Fr.
67 which says: 
The God <is> day <and> night, winter <and> summer, war <and> peace, satiety <and>
famine, and undergoes change in the way that <fire?>, whenever it is mixed with
species, gets called by the name that accords with <the> bouquet of each <spice>.5
In the light of it, at least two points are certain: 
1. the god is the source of multiple oppositions, and 
2. it gets called by the name that accords with the nature it presents. 
The god subsumes all the ‘opposite’ features that the universe exhibits, but this
does not mean that Heraclitus is out to tell us that Zeus is as much a god of death
as he is of life, and there is no particular stress on the opposites ‘life’ and ‘death’,
for in fact these do not even get a mention on Heraclitus’ list.
If this is the case, and name follows aspect, one may wonder whether the sense
of the fragment exhausts itself in the metaphorical use of the name, or whether it is
the other way round: the use of the name points out to a hidden equation of the wise
unique principle with the god Zeus, as he was traditionally conceived6. 
2. Zeus: the Sky and the Direction of the universe 
a. The only fragment where Zeus is mentioned is fr.120 (Strabo 1.6), and there
he is associated to the bright sky:
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5 Translations throughout are those of Robinson (1987).
6 The question of names and classifications does not seem to belong to the one wise in itself, but rather
to our understanding, for the real, while differing, is said to be in agreement with itself, as there it lies
a back-turning connection between the opposites (Cf. Fr. 51). It seems that any name emphasizes only
one isolated aspect and so it remains blind to manifest the essential hidden harmony that lies behind.
In the light of this, Heraclitus should be saying that the unique wise one is not willing to be called by
any particular name, rather than affirming the paradox of Fr. 32.
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<The> limits of dawn and evening are the Bear and, opposite the Bear, <the> Watcher
(?) of bright Zeus (aithríou Diós).
b. Zeus seems to be clearly alluded to also in fr. 64 (Hippolytus, Refutation of
All Heresies 9.10.7): 
And thunderbolt steers the totality of things.
c. Finally, it is worth noting that in fr. 53 (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies
9.9.4) the attributes traditionally ascribed to Zeus are transposed to war: 
War is father of all, and king of all. He renders some gods, others men; he makes some
slaves, others free.
3. Sophón: the intelligent plan is separated (and not separated) 
It is worth remarking that fr. 41 (Diogenes Laertius 9.1) starts with exactly the
same words as does our fragment, except for the omission of the adverb ‘only’: 
He says that the wise <thing> is a single <thing> (or, differently punctuated: one thing,
the wise thing, <is>) knowing the plan (gnómen) +which steers+ all things through all
things (pánta dià pánton).
The wise attitude for men is to get to know and master the intelligent plan that
steers the cosmos. I cannot analyze this difficult fragment in full here but would like
to observe that, on the one hand, the fragment shows that there is an evident con-
nection between wisdom and planning, while on the other hand, the government
associated to it, which is attributed to Thunderbolt in fr. 64, seems to come at a sec-
ond ‘stage’ or, at least, due to the corruption, we cannot know how it is related to
the plan. 
The adjective ‘wise’ (sophón) is also present in fr. 108 (John Stobaeus 3.1.174): 
Of all the accounts I have listened to, none gets to the point of recognizing that which
is wise, set apart (kechôrismenon) from all.
Here a new feature is provided: what is wise is separated from all things or, in
Curd’s words7, it is different from the phenomena. The category of ‘difference’ or
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‘separation’ is not an absolute one in Heraclitus. For another paradox, let us con-
sider fr. 72 (Marcus Aurelius 4.46):
They are separated (diaphérontai) from that with which they are in the most continuous
contact.
This is likely to mean that the majority of mankind are ‘separated’ from lógos,
while lógos, being common (fr. 2), is present to them8. It has been suggested that
Lógos encompasses both being and becoming9. Following an analogous line, we
could argue that the only wise principle is willing to accept the name of Zeus, when
this name is appropriate to it, namely, when it takes on a new presentation. For
according to Heraclitus, the name both hides and reveals the thing. The hypothesis
I shall try to defend, in the light of the Derveni Papyrus, is that the principle does
not want to be called ‘Zeus’ when identified with ‘the wise plan that remains sepa-
rated’ or, to say it in a word, when identified with ‘its being one’, and it is also will-
ing to be called ‘Zeus’ when it ‘becomes multiple’ as the universe. 
Two other fragments support the thesis that it is the same one that becomes mul-
tiple. On the one hand, fr. 50 (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.1) which
contains both hén and sophón, ascertains that not listening to Heraclitus himself, but
to the lógos, it is wise to agree that 
‘all things are one’.
This epistemological main thesis is closely connected to the end of fr. 10
([Aristotle] De Mundo 5.396 b 20) where it is said, in a more cosmological key, that:
‘out of all <comes?> one, and out of one, all’,
a claim which agrees with the interpretation presented in the Derveni Papyrus, and
also with fr. 30 (Clement, Stromateis 5.103.6) where it is said:
<The ordered> world, the same for all, no god or man made, but it always was, is and
will be an ever-living fire, being kindled in measures and being put out in measures.
I take this fragment to mean that there is no mythological demiourgós in a strict
sense, but an eternal unique wise principle that transforms itself: when it becomes
multiple, it can be called by the name of Zeus (i.e. Thunderbolt: Bright Fire Sky).
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III. The evidence in the Derveni Papyrus
Heraclitus is not an Orphic but he adopts Orphic writings describing the world
through opposites and their unity. The Derveni Commentator does not regard him-
self as a Heraclitean, but turns out to be an eclectic religious author who shows
some influence from different Presocratic sources, such as Anaxagoras, Diogenes of
Apollonia, Democritus and Empedocles. However, he not only seems to have had
access to Heraclitus’ book10 but mentions and quotes Heraclitus in col. IV. 5-1011.
Could this anonymous Commentator of an Orphic poem in a badly fragmented
text, who is likely to have produced the text around 400 B.C., possibly throw light
on the background to fr. 32, in order to overcome the difficulties that most inter-
pretations face? I am aware that this is a risky task12 for two reasons: on the one
hand, because the reconstructions of the text of the Derveni Papyrus are far from
definitive, and on the other hand, because there is no fixed code for deciphering the
sense of a fragmented piece, be it attributed to Heraclitus or to Orpheus. And yet, it
is likely that the brief Poem being commented upon, which is addressed to the ini-
tiated, belonged to the beginning of the –V century or even earlier13. In my view,
he can at least provide us with essential information that could open our minds to a
new approach to the fragment, which seems to fit with the fragments considered
above14. 
As Heraclitus himself did, the Commentator constantly opposes his own view
to another interpretation which he regards as the obvious, primary, literal one that
satisfies the ignorant. He treats the poem as allegorical in a strong sense, and urges
us to go beyond the surface meaning, while he is critical of certain religious rites
because they deprive people of belief, hope and learning (cf. Col. XX). This criti-
cism places the Commentator very close to Heraclitus’s own position on the point
(cf. fr. 5). 
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12 For a record of the authors, such as Macchioro and Nestle, who were censored for showing com-
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ing that Fr. 32 ‘fits in easily with the pervasive allegorizing which we find throughout but especially
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Let us summarize the main points that could help us make fr. 32 understandable:
a) the Commentator suggests the idea that when the one becomes multiple it gets
the form and name of Zeus, and he gives an etymological account of Zeus’s name
as ‘born’;
b) he indicates that Zeus acts wisely with an intelligence that precedes him, an
intelligence which is identified with Mêtis in Col. XV, with Noûs in Col. XVI and
with Moîra (Phrónesis toû theoû) in Col. XVIII. 
c) he also points out, on many occasions, that there is a continuity in identity
between that first intelligent principle and Zeus 15.
In col. VIII. 4 Zeus appears for the first time, and is called the ‘mighty king’
from whom things were born. The goal of the Commentator here is to persuade us
that Zeus inherited his arché (which, as has recently been emphasized16, means both
‘power’ and ‘principle’) from his father Kronos legally, not by force, nor contrary
to prophecies. Then Zeus visits Night, the primordial divinity who knows every-
thing, to get to know how to keep his power. He starts his reign by devouring
Uranus’s phallus. This way he avoids the possibility of being dethroned and gets the
chance to re-create the world as well. In order to be the supreme god forever, Zeus
cannot be preceded by anyone, or be followed by anyone more powerful. By hav-
ing the first God’s phallus inside, he becomes pregnant of the whole. Once it has
been shown, from the mythical point of view, that there must only be one god, the
Commentator devotes his work to consolidating the authority of Zeus. 
1. Col. XV: Zeus is Mêtis17
In col. XV, after quoting a line of the poem, the Commentator explains that Zeus
is not a different one but, we can assume, is to be identified with Noûs:
‘following him (ek toû) in turn was Kronos, and then Zeus the contriver (metíeta)’:
He means something like ‘from that time (ek toûde) is the beginning (arché), from
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should account for the negative will of the unique principle to be named after a god that people think
that belongs to change and becoming; 2. Zenòs (expression which also appears in the Papyrus) is iden-
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Zeus is not just one god among others, but the wise King that steers the world. 
16 Bernabé (2009) 59. I am following his summary in my short description.
17 I am using the Tsantsanoglou-Parássoglou translation into English in Kouremenos-Parássoglou-
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which this magistracy (arché) reigns’. It has been related that Noûs, striking the ónta to
one another and setting them apart toward the present transformative stage, [created]
from different things, not different ones, but diversified ones. As for the phrase ‘and
then Zeus the contriver’, that he is not a different one but the same is clear. And this
indicates it:
Metis…royal honor
…sinews… (Col. XV. 6-15)
When Zeus takes over, he receives, together with the royal dignity of the gods,
also mêtis, a complex concept that combines cleverness, prevision, flexibility and
simulative powers18. After devouring his Grandfather’s phallus he has the power to
replace the original chaotic creation with a planned organized universe. Thus this
kind of ‘universal mother and father’, to say it with Bernabé, goes back to the ori-
gin and turns out to be the first in the sequence of all the gods, as he reverses the
order of time. It is not difficult to perceive that the Commentator, coming from an
Orphic background, is making efforts to offer a syncretic outlook which might turn
out to be acceptable both to enlightened religious men and women and philosophers
as well. Might Heraclitus be sharing a similar outlook, while departing from philo-
sophical background, starting from a unique wise principle towards the allowance
of a kind of ‘second sense’ identification of it with the well known King of the
Gods? 
2. Col. XVI: The King is Noûs19
The Commentator quotes four verses from the poem20 and then he says:
In these verses he indicates that the ónta always existed and that the present
ónta come to be from the existing ones. As for the phrase ‘and he himself became
the sole one (moûnos égento)’, by saying this he makes it clear that Noûs, is always
worth everything being alone (món[o]n eónta), as if the rest were nothing. For it is
not [possible] for the present eónta to exist [because of] them (sc. the existing ones)
without Noûs. [Also in the verse] after this [he said that Noûs] is worth everything:
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[And now he is] king of all [and will be] afterwards.
[It is clear that] ‘Noûs’ and [‘king of all’ are the] same thing. … (Col. XVI. 7-15) 
Obviously the Poem says nothing about Noûs but only speaks about the King
that was first born, and ends by remarking that he was ‘the sole one’, i.e. no god
will ever be able to dethrone him because he is the first one, and everything else
depends on him for existence. The Commentator identifies the Protogónou basiléos
with Noûs, and then he explains why he ‘became the sole one’. It is so because of
Noûs’ dignity and power to plan and generate all the things that exist. While the
final identification of Noûs and the King is unfortunately perversely lacunose, we
can still have some confidence about the implications of what the Commentator is
saying21. 
3. Col. XVII: Air is Zeus
In col. XVII, the Commentator identifies Air and Zeus. He writes:
it (sc. Air) existed before it was named; then it was named. For air both existed before
the present eónta were set together and will always exist. For it did not come to be but
existed. And why it was called Air has been made clear earlier in this book. But after it
had been named Zeus, it was thought that it was born, as if it did not exist before. He
also said that it will be ‘last’, after it was named Zeus and this continues being its name
until the present eónta were set together into the same state in which they were floating
as former eónta. And it is made clear that the eónta became such because of it and, hav-
ing come to be, [are again] in it. He indicates in this words:
Zeus is the head, Zeus the middle, and from Zeus is everything fashioned. 
Head… he allegorizes that the eónta … head … beginning of constitution… to have
been constituted … (Col. XVII 1-15)
It is clear that Air is the eternal principle, but when it was named ‘Zeus’ confu-
sion arose and it was thought to have been born, which means that ‘Zeus’ is the
name used to emphasize a different moment or stage of the same principle, name-
ly, ‘the beginning’ or birth of a new configuration. On the other hand, the name
‘Zeus’ also refers to its being ‘last’. In other words, when the eternal principle (air)
is called ‘Zeus’ we should understand we are talking of the period when the eternal
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principle transformed itself into a multiplicity of beings. Thus the Commentator
seems to reveal to us that this period, which had a beginning, will also have an end,
when the present beings will go back to their previous unformed floating state.
Therefore, when we say ‘Zeus’ we are still naming the eternal principle but mainly
denoting its multiple appearance of beings which belong to the realm of becoming,
(and, as such, are sentenced to being generated and to dying, to being assembled
and disassembled). 
It has been observed22 that the Commentator uses a ‘systematic terminology’ to
explain the causes of Zeus’s powers, when he places on the same level his divinity
and two principles: air and Noûs, which belong to a more ‘philosophical’ field.
However, it is not just the case that ‘Zeus becomes a unique generation principle,
while in the form of air or Noûs, being present in all beings in order to dominate
them at will’, but the sequence seems to be just the other way round: when the eter-
nal principle, which we are allowed to call either Noûs or Air, receives the name of
‘Zeus’, it is associated both with ‘being born’ and also with ‘dying’.
4. Col. XVIII: Pneûma, Moîra and Phrónesis toû theoû
Here the Commentator adds new names and identities to the divine. First he
asserts that everything in the air is breath or wind. Then he affirms that Orpheus
called it ‘Moira’. And he adds: 
‘… before it was called Zêna, Moira existed, being the thought of God eternally and
[d]ià pantós. But after it had been called Zeus it was thought that it was born, though it
existed before too, but it was not named. [This is why] he says
Zeus was born first.
For first was [Moira the thought], later it was held to be sacred Zeus. But peo-
ple [not understanding] the meaning of what is said [come to view] Zêna as being
the first born [god] … Col. XVIII.9-15
5. Col. XIX: All things were called Zeus, for the air dominates them all 
The Commentator reveals that the expression ‘Moira spun’ means that the
thought of Zeus ratified in what way what will exist, what exists and what will
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cease, must be so. He quotes a verse of the poem where Zeus is king, the ruler of
all and ‘he of the bright bolt’ which correspond to the descriptions that Heraclitus
presents in fr. 53 and fr. 64. 
6. Col. XXI.5-7: Ouranian, Aphrodite, Zeus, Peitho and Harmonia
All these names denote the same god, for each one is connected to the way the
eónta join and separate in their process of coming to be and ceasing. Again, the
Commentator and Heraclitus have a point in common: the same god admits differ-
ent names, either according to the element that prevails (Heraclitus, fr. 67) or the
function it performs (DP).
7. Col. XXIII: The same Zeus contrived himself
Here the Commentator interprets a misleading verse of the poem. It is not the
case that Zeus contrived Oceanus as something different from itself, but:
‘Oceanus is the air, and that air is Zeus. Therefore, it was not another Zeus who ‘con-
trived’ Zeus, but the same one (contrived) for himself ‘great might’.
(Col. XXIII.3-5)
8. Col. XXV. 14: The mind (phrén) of Zeus devised all things
The same ideas advanced at the beginning are repeated using a new word: phrén.
9. Col. XXVI. 1: Noûs is the Mother of the other things
This final column presents many difficulties, but we can be sure that the
Commentator intends to persuade us that Zeus does not want to mingle in love with
his own mother, but he is likely to do so with his own Mind, if we follow an anal-
ogous argument in XXIII.
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IV. Conclusion
On this background, we can understand fr. 32 as denoting a peculiar pantheistic
account in a nutshell. There is a unique wise one that does not want to be called
‘Zeus’ in the first place, for it is eternal. But, as we learn from the Derveni Papyrus,
the eternal principle diversified itself and became multiple, and things were born to
their present state. In this sense, it does want to be named ‘Zeus’, for ‘from this per-
spective’, the name is applicable. In addition, the Papyrus also seems to suggest that
it admits that name associated to the birth of everything, during the time that change
takes place, till everything goes back to the first state, denoting a kind of cycle that
goes from pure eternal singularity to cosmic multiplicity. This fits with Heraclitus’s
doctrine that there is no creation of the cosmos, but a kind of derivation of all things
from the one and vice-versa (cf. fr. 10). On the other hand, it could be objected that
Heraclitus does not appeal either to noûs or air, in our fragment. Although he does
not use either of these names to refer to his neutral principle, and though he empha-
sizes the role played by fire in other fragments (such as frs. 30, 31, and 90), he clear-
ly points out that it is ‘the god’, and not the one only wise, who takes opposite forms
and appearances, as it undergoes change (cf. fr. 67). 
Furthermore, the connection with air is somehow present, for the bright sky is
the realm of Zeus (cf. fr. 120), and the movements of the stars are the way he seems
to control the universe by perfect predictable movements. 
It is time now to go back to the partially anthropomorphic reading and consid-
er whether it can be saved in the light in the Papyrus. Is it the meaning of fr. 32 to
claim that on the one hand, a neutral principle will, in the first place, expect that the
instructed only call it ‘one and wise’, for they are those who should really know
where wisdom and ultimate divineness of the cosmos lies, (i.e., in the upper domain
of the stars, which are made of aither, i.e. air at its hottest, driest and therefore
‘purest and best’), while on the other hand, ‘on second thoughts’, it would also tol-
erate an anthropomorphic description of himself as ‘Zeus’ by the uninstructed? 
Our fragment is a privileged text in which the authentic divine will is revealed.
In general terms Heraclitus is reluctant to accept religion as the best treatment of the
divine. Therefore it turns out to be hard to imagine that the only wise one would be
really willing to be treated in a (wrong) religious anthropomorphic way by the unin-
structed.
In my view, the diachronic interpretation offered in the Papyrus offers an out-
look that fits better with the surviving fragments of Heraclitus. On this reading, we
might assume that fr. 32 may mean that the unique wise one, in the first place, does
not wish to be called by the name of Zeus because this name ascribes birth and
diversification to it, while it is, as such, eternal and simple. On the other hand, as it
cyclically becomes multiple, it is also willing to be identified with Zeus, the God
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who, according to the Papyrus, swallowed his Grandfather’s phallus along with
Mind, got pregnant of everything and re-created the universe, in order to become
first, end and centre of the world, while being the Ethereal component that gives life
to everything and the Intelligence that steers the whole.
Bibliography
BERNABÉ, A., Textos órficos y filosofía presocrática. Materiales para una compa-
ración Madrid, 2004.
BERNABÉ, A., Poetae Epici Graeci. Testimonia et Fragmenta. Pars II: Orphicorum
et Orphicis similium testimonia et fragmenta, Fasciculi 1 et 2, Monachii et
Lipsiae 2004-5, fasc. 3, Berolinimet Novi Elaboraci 2007.
BERNABÉ, A., ‘L’Inno a Zeus Orfico. Vicissitudini letterarie, ideologiche e religio-
se’ RFIC 137, 2009, 56-85.
BETEGH, G., The Derveni Papyrus, Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation,
Cambridge, 2004.
BURKERT, W., ‘La genèse des choses et des mots. Le Papyrus de Derveni entre
Anaxagore et Cratyle’, Études Philosophiques, 25, 1970, 443-55.
BURKERT, W., ‘Star Wars or One Stable World?’A Problem of Presocratic
Cosmogony (PDerv. Col. XXV) in Studies on the Derveni Papyrus, A. Laks and
G. Most, (eds.), Oxford, 1997, 167-74.
CASADESÚS, F., ‘Heráclito y el orfismo’, Enrahonar, 23, 1995.
CASADESÚS, F., ‘Metis, el noûs, el aire y Zeus en el Papiro de Derveni’, Faventia
18, 1996, 75-88.
CURD, P., ‘Knowledge and Unity in Heraclitus’, The Monist, 1991, 531-549.
KAHN, C., The Art and Thought of Heraclitus, Cambridge, 1979.
KAHN, C., ‘Was Euthyphro the author of the Derveni Papyrus?’ in Studies on the
Derveni Papyrus, A. Laks and G. Most, (eds.), Oxford, 1997, 55-64.
KIRK, G. S., RAVEN, J.E., and SCHOFIELD, M., The Pre-Socratic Philosophers,
Cambridge, 1983.
KOUREMENOS, T., PARÁSSOGLOU, G., TSANTSANOGLOU, K. (eds.), The Derveni
Papyrus, Firenze, 2006. 
MONDOLFO, R., Heráclito, Textos y Problemas de su interpretación, México, Siglo
XXI, 1966.
ROBINSON, T.M., Heraclitus, Fragments, A Text and Translation with a
Commentary, Toronto U.P., 1987.
SIDER, D., ‘Heraclitus in the Derveni Papyrus’, in Studies on the Derveni Papyrus,
A. Laks and G. Most, (eds.), Oxford, 1997, 129-148. 
Beatriz Bossi Heraclitus B 32 Revisited in the Light of the Derveni Papyrus
Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía
Vol. 28 (2011): 9-22
22
1 Bossi:Maquetación 1  18/10/2011  14:11  Página 22
